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Abstract: 
Using the conceptual framework of a developmental state, forwarded by the Economic 
Commission for Africa, it was found that Ethiopia’s democratic developmental state is unique 
and  operates differently from the Malaysian developmental state model. Economically, Ethiopia 
has recorded staggering economic growth since it adopted the developmental state. The 
Malaysian developmental state was developed to be market-oriented and as a result Malaysia’s 
GDP grew at 5.23 percent from 2005-2011.  Malaysia’s incidence of poverty declined from 49% 
in 1970 to less than 5% in 2000. Ethiopia has focused on a planned developmental state, without 
speeding the direction of industrialization, and has achieved an average 9.9 percent growth rate 
in GDP from 2005-2011.  With economic growth, the poverty reduction measured by poverty 
head count in Ethiopia has declined from 41.9 in 2005 to 29.6 percent in 2011. Although 
Ethiopia’s Human Development Index (HDI) has increased by 16% from 2005 to 2011, its HDI 
score is about 22% less than the average score of sub-Saharan countries. The poverty ratio of 
people living on less than $1.25 a day in Ethiopia is very close to about 30 percent. It means that 
those with low incomes have not benefitted from the staggering economic growth that much of 
the country has achieved in the last seven years. 
 
The theory of a developmental state model proposes that professional bureaucratic elites design, 
manage, and run autonomously the short and long range plans of a country. In the Ethiopian 
“Democratic Developmental State” the short and long term plans are controlled by the ruling 
party, EPRD. The public and private sectors are minimally involved in the planning process. The 
economic growth rate which Ethiopia achieved from 2005 to 2011 doesn’t operate in a fully 
market-friendly environment. Far from operating in a developmental state, Ethiopia operates 
under a centralized system. Also, in an era of economic globalism, the Malaysian type of 
developmental state model is outdated and is no longer relevant for Ethiopia. Therefore, to 
achieve optimal sustainable development, and thereby feed its people, Ethiopia must focus on an 
integrated, environmentally sensitive, and cooperative agriculturally-based type of development 
model. 
 
Keywords:  Democratic Developmental state, environmentally-friendly market system, 
centrally-planned system, state-led growth, autonomous professional elites. 
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Introduction 
The Economic Commission for Africa (2011) argues that African States would catch up and 
accomplish a vibrant economic system if they could emulate Malaysia’s developmental state 
model along with addressing democratic values that would allow the citizens to play meaningful 
roles in the country’s governance. With this understanding in mind, the purpose of this study is 
first to determine if Ethiopia has established the groundwork necessary for the implementation of 
a developmental state that is similar to the Malaysian developmental state model; and second to 
ask if the Ethiopian developmental state model is moving towards establishing a participatory 
democratic developmental state, unlike the East Asian authoritarian developmental states which 
have postponed  democracy until economic development is achieved. 
 
The comparison of the developmental strategies of Malaysia and Ethiopia is based on the 
following characteristics of the developmental state model as suggested by Johnson (1982), 
Wade (1990), Fingleton (1996) and Dadzie  (2012). According to their assessment, a 
developmental state is: 
 
a) autonomous and heavily involved in a macroeconomic planning process, needed 
to promote structural transformation and which plays a strategic role in economic 
development; 
b) staffed by highly qualified, professional government elites (i.e., insulated from the 
political process and not influenced by politicians, workers or the corporate class 
through the political process) who are given sufficient latitude to develop 
initiatives and operate effectively; 
c) selfless in designing strategic visions, planning innovative processes, formulating 
appropriate policies and implementing plans to transform their societies; 
d) a catalyst for efficiently executing the developmental (industrialization) goals of 
the nation; 
e) democratic, allowing the citizens to play meaningful roles in the country’s 
governance process; 
f) encouraging to public-private strategic coalitions or cooperatives that are shaped 
by societal forces; 
g) supportive of entrepreneurs who undertake risky ventures; 
h) equipped with infrastructures, trained human and social capital and politically 
stable environments to entice foreign investors with capital, management, and 
marketing expertise to invest in the country. 
 
More specifically, to assess the Ethiopian developmental state based on the attributes of the 
Malaysian developmental state, as forwarded by the Economic Commission for Africa, the 
following vital questions are posed: 
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1) Is Ethiopia’s commitment to the democratic development state goal supported by a 
strong vision that is tailored to trigger a process of profound societal transformation? 
2) Is the developmental state planning process in Ethiopia designed by competent, 
efficient and autonomous professional bureaucrats who work collaboratively with the 
private sector in policy-making efforts? 
3) Is the developmental state plan in Ethiopia managed by competent, professional 
bureaucrats that are solely recruited on meritocracy to work autonomously---free 
from forming close relations with the politico-legislative elites? 
4) Are the Ethiopian bureaucratic elites free from corruption and rent-seeking 
mechanisms in order to effectively manage and perform their duties? 
5) To attract foreign investors with capital, management, and marketing expertise, is   
the Ethiopian environment equipped with an investor-friendly and permissive 
environment equipped with 1) the necessary infrastructures, 2) trained human capital, 
and 3) a politically stable environment that includes well established rules of law and 
social accountability? 
6) Is the Ethiopian developmental state operating in a democratization process that calls 
for accountability, transparency, and the participation of the public in policy-making? 
 
The Vision of a Developmental State 
The history of development in Malaysia points out that an important component of development 
relies on state action. That is, state action in industrial upgrading, employment generation, 
reduction of inequality, and the protection of civil liberties is necessary to prevent 
underdevelopment. Infused with private sector ingenuity, the autonomous public sector in 
Malaysia has been used as a catalyst for development to meet the overarching, ‘2020 Malaysia 
developmental Vision.’  That is, the 2020 Malaysian Vision was planned by the Malaysian 
government to create a fully developed nation and to facilitate growth with improved equity and 
poverty reduction. As a result, the expansion of economic coordination and due to judicious state 
intervention within the Malaysian developmental state, schools, roads, health centers and public 
housing have made a steady transition from poverty towards achieving its developmental state 
agenda (Khoo, S. 2007). 
 
As in Malaysia, since 2004, Ethiopia has identified the development of agriculture as a means to 
industrial development and has made this a priority policy. Recently, the policy makers in 
Ethiopia have embarked on the five-year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) for the period 
2010/11 to 2014/15, to achieve not only the United Nations Millennium Development Goals but 
also to develop Ethiopia into one of the middle income countries by 2020-2030 (Kunama, G. 
May 12, 2011). 
 
To rekindle the Ethiopian economy, which was on the brink of colossal failure during the 
military (Derge) regime, Ethiopia’s current Democratic Developmental State Model has been 
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guided by very strong governmental intervention in the market, giving power and authority to the 
government bureaucracy to plan, supervise, and implement the developmental processes of the 
country. The developmental state governs the process of investing in key economic sectors. The 
matrix presented in Table 1 gives a template that can be used to compare the conditions of the 
developmental states operating in both Malaysia and Ethiopia. For the last seven years (i.e., 
2005-2011), while Malaysia’s GDP grew at 5.23 percent, Ethiopia, without speeding the 
direction of industrialization and being mainly centralized rather than fully market-oriented, 
achieved an average of 9.9 percent growth rate in its GDP. 
 
As targeted by the Malaysian Developmental State Model, the incidence of poverty in Malaysia 
declined from 49% in 1970 to about 5% in 2000 (Khoo, 2007). Realizing record economic 
growth, the poverty reduction measured by poverty head count in Ethiopia has declined from 
41.9% in 2005 to 29.6% in 2011, significant when considering the time span. Similarly, Ethiopia 
has achieved a remarkable trend in establishing health services according to its 0.619 health 
index (compared to Malaysia’s health index of 0.855). Similarly, due to poverty reduction and 
access to health benefits and the expansion of the Ethiopian economy, the Human Development 
Index (HDI), measuring life expectancy, the level of schooling (adult literacy rate),  and real 
GDP per capita (standard of living), Malaysia’s HDI  improved by 3.1% (i.e., from 0.738 in 2005 
to  0.761 in 2011), whereas, even though Ethiopia’s HDI improved by 16% (i.e., from 0.313 in 
2005 to  0.363 in 2011), its HDI score is about 22% less than the average score of sub-Saharan 
countries. 
 
One can conclude that the Ethiopian developmental state has played an important role in 
supporting quantitative economic growth. However, those with low incomes don’t appear to 
benefit from the staggering economic growth of the country. The poverty ratio of people living 
on less than $1.25 a day in Ethiopia is very close to about 30 percent. Based on the extreme 
social inequalities and abject poverty that still exist in the country, it is possible to show that the 
majority of Ethiopians have not been able to share the benefits of the country’s economic growth 
during the last seven years. It is also possible that Ethiopia may not achieve what it has set for its 
2015 Millennium Development Goal because of escalating fuel prices, loose monetary policy 
mainly used for public infrastructure investment, and high prices of edible food products. 
 
The Ethiopian government is expected to spend 4.5% of GDP to attain the Millennium 
Development Goal of 100% primary school completion by 2015 (World Bank, 2005, p. 172),  
but as shown in Table 1, Ethiopia’s GDP expenditure on education is 5.5%, compared to 
Malaysia’s 4.6%.  Nonetheless, the education index of Ethiopia is only 0.237 compared to 0.73 
for Malaysia. That is, while 73% of the school age children in Malaysia complete primary and 
secondary schools only 24% of Ethiopian children complete their primary and secondary 
schooling. In addition, in terms of quality and equity, Ethiopia has the highest student-teacher 
ratio in the world. It was reported by the World Bank that since 1993-94, the pupil-teacher ratio 
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is 65:1 and the number of pupils per section is 75 to 82 in government primary schools, 
compared with about 30:1 in privately operated schools in non-governmental organizations 
(2005, p. xxiv). Thus, when compared with Malaysia, Ethiopia gives less emphasis on 
investment in human capital as an important ingredient for economic transformation and the 
assumptions of the developmental state model. 
 
If Ethiopia’s intended plans and visions had been fully implemented, there is no doubt they could 
have achieved their intended goals. However, many fruitful projects were delayed because the 
governmental functionaries lacked the professionalism and commitment needed to mobilize the 
limited resources of the nation (See Desta, July 7, 2011). Put differently, if the Ethiopian 
functionaries had been willing to operate efficiently to address the economic challenges of the 
country and if government intervention had been implemented carefully, there is little doubt that 
these plans would have generated the greatest welfare for the largest numbers of Ethiopians. 
 
There was a missing precondition in Ethiopia’s developmental policies that having to do with 
rent-seeking practices. As pointed out by Fischer (2011; Kaufmann, 1998, p. 524) since rent-
seeking is a means of resistance to reform, it may be seen as a kind of ‘legitimized theft’ 
purposely designed by government officials to appropriate rent in order to maximize their ability 
to embezzle  funds and demand bribes from their clients. In addition, rent-seekers may also be 
powerful interest groups or lobbyists who exert considerable influence, who bribe government 
bureaucrats to hinder competitors so that their inefficient companies win governmental tenders. 
Thus, as a result of rent-seeking, many projects have not been implemented adequately in 
Ethiopia and as a result the policy outcomes have been negatively affected. It is also possible that 
austerity measures might not have been whole-heartedly endorsed by the ruling party.  Also, the 
government’s decisions to introduce reforms might have lacked coalition support by policy 
advisers and technocrats. As stated by Pang (2000), technocrats generally make decisions with 
national interest at heart, but with an eye to global realities. “What matters to them is what their 
colleagues overseas think of their actions. They are interchangeable technocrats, moveable parts 
of the their governments, often influenced by the views of those sitting in Washington, London, 
Bonn , Paris…”. 
 
Finally, the Ethiopian government’s vision is to enhance large and ambitious development 
projects in order to accomplish the five year Growth and Transformation Plan in the short run, 
end poverty and become a middle income country in the long run. Instead of searching for the 
optimal combinations of local resources, Ethiopia’s developmental state calls for foreign capital 
to finance its yearly budgets deficits, thus it may be very difficult to accomplish its ambitious 
plans (See for example, Ohashi, Nazret.com, 6/9/2011). 
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Table 1: The Economic and Social Performance of Ethiopian Developmental State 
(2000-2011) 
Indicators Malaysia  Ethiopia 
2000 2005 2011  2000 2005 2011 
      
        
Human Dev. 
Index 
(value) 
0.705 0.738 0.761  0.274 0.313 0.36
3 
Heath Status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Life 
Expectancy(y
ears) 
  74. 2   52 59.
3 
Health index  
 
 
 
 
0.855 
  
 
 
 
0.619 
Expenditure 
on health (% 
GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
1.9 
  
 
 
 
2.2 
Economic 
Status 
       
Real GDP/ 
capita ($) 
 4937.43 10, 429. 51   
 
119.28 
 
605.71 
Annual GDP 
Growth (%) 
8.9 5.3 5.16  6.1 
 
11.8 
 
8.0 
Poverty ratio, 
people living  
below $1. 
25/day (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
<5.0 
 41.9 
 
39.0 
 
29.6 
Consumer 
price index 
 9.0 22.0   
 
38 
 
40..0 
Education 
 
       
School life 
expectancy 
 
 
 
 
11.5 
 
   4.
3 
Education 
index 
  0.73   
 
 
 
0.237 
Primary 
school 
enrollment 
  0.70  61.6 
 
74.2 
 
90.
7 
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Secondary  
school 
enrollment 
    17.1 
 
23.1 
 
20.3 
Educ. 
Exp/GDP 
  4.6   
 
 
 
5.5 
 
Source: CSA abstract, 2003-2011;LISANE MASIE, March, 2012; World Bank (2011), World 
Bank Indicators 2011, Washington, D.C. 
 
 
 
 
 
Meritocratic Bureaucracy 
For elites and state institutions to play leading roles in steering the economy, the developmental 
state needs to be relatively autonomous. As stated by Nordlinger (1987:361), autonomy is 
defined simply to mean that the state achieves independence from the demanding clamor of 
special interest groups.  Evans (1994) argues that a developmental state is more effective and 
efficient than a predatory (parasitic) state because it is managed and run by autonomous 
professional elites.  Starting in the 1990s, being accountable to the public, the civil service in 
Malaysia has become embedded with the private sector and together they have been able to co-
ordinate the economy. Thus, as stated by Zalanga (2012), using the “Client’s Charter” reform, 
Malaysia has empowered the public by letting them know the minimum to expect from their 
public servants. 
 
In line with highly selective meritocratic recruitment and long-term career rewards, the civil 
servants in Malaysia are recruited through a rigorous national examination system. Once 
employed, the employees undergo thorough and extensive training in their respective ministries. 
The skills and knowledge they acquire allow the bureaucrats to carry out their administrative 
duties with no major interruptions from politicians. In addition, the remarkable economic growth 
in Malaysia reveals the positive impact that a professional and comparatively meritocratic 
bureaucracy can contribute to economic growth, if the economic decision making is insulated 
from political pressures. 
 
In the Ethiopian polity, on the other hand, private economic interest is carefully monitored and 
the possibility of an emerging leadership is limited. The functional requirements of economic 
growth and diversification by and large are left up to the prerogative of the developmental state. 
The bureaucracy is managed by civil servants, functionaries that are primarily recruited on 
meritocracy and have clearly defined functional obligations to serve competently. Similarly in 
Ethiopia, state functionaries are required to attend various in-service seminars or they are sent 
abroad to upgrade their professional standards and skills.  But the institutions within which the 
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various functionaries operate are not autonomous. “From an equal representation point of view, 
the higher positions in governmental departments are assigned according to an ethnic-based 
quota system. …the perception held by the public is that the bureaucrats are expected to operate 
in line with their ethnic affiliation rather than in pursuit of the goals of the organization” (Desta, 
2012, p. 20). In addition, the state-driven developmental model is conditioned on a set of 
paradigmatic practices such as cronyism and unofficial favoritism for selecting and allocating a 
number of business firms from certain ethnic groups. 
 
Insulation of Bureaucracy from Political and Societal Forces 
The Malaysian developmental state goal is to achieve rapid economic development. Thus, it 
gives power and authority to the bureaucracy to plan, supervise and implement efficient policies.  
Like Malaysian bureaucrats, Ethiopian elites are highly skilled and well-motivated individuals 
who are the most talented graduates of the best universities in the country and abroad. 
Nonetheless, because they are recruited with regard to ethnic affiliation, they are strongly 
influenced by the ruling elites accountable to their regional state. Thus, Ethiopia, like Malaysia, 
appears to be a developmental state that has practiced judicious state intervention at some points, 
but the state interventions at other points seem to be achieved through ethnic political bargaining. 
Because of this, the bureaucratic leaders and high-ranking civil servants in Ethiopia are involved 
in widespread corruption. Instead of having selfless devotion to the Ethiopian economy, civil 
servants have become political cadres recruited for the maintenance of the party in power. 
 
Though non-partisan professional public service is a prerequisite for a developmental state, the 
plans Ethiopia designed did neither take feedback from the private sector nor establish an 
interface relationship between the ruling party cadres, who focus mostly on policy-related and 
political matters in their departments or ministry, and those appointed as civil servants, who are 
also known as the “politics-administration interface” (See for example, Maphunye, April 2009). 
The developmental plans are too ambitious and are not initially based on the well-established 
infrastructure that would have engineered Ethiopia’s take off strategy. For example, unlike what 
is heavily practiced in Japan and to some extent in Malaysia, the bureaucracy is far removed 
from the corporate sector. Former government officials of Ethiopia are rarely encouraged to take 
positions in top posts of private corporations after retirement where they could be engaged in 
transforming the institutions. 
 
Market-orientations and Foreign Direct Investment 
With feedback from the private sector and by allowing the market to operate freely, the Malaysia 
developmental state is heavily involved in designing its developmental plans, creating 
implementation strategies and constructing summative evaluation techniques. To serve its 
national developmental goals the Malaysian developmental state has created a stable state, and 
invested heavily in infrastructure such as highways, electricity, telecommunication, and 
information technology. It provides health services, quality housing, schools for its citizens and 
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has introduced long-term state-determined incentives, all necessary for development. This 
approach enabled Malaysia’s phenomenal success in attracting foreign direct investors to invest 
in the country.  To make its products globally competitive, the Malaysian economy is open and 
has upgraded the quality of its administrative and production system to the level of receiving 
international recognition in form of the ISO 9000 certification. Thus, the Malaysian government 
is doing everything possible to make the Malaysian economy competitive while also achieving 
sustainability. As stated by Khoo (2007), the Malaysia’s rapid growth trajectory is based on the 
global market. 
 
Shifting from an agricultural to an industrial economy is very strenuous, so to speed up 
Ethiopia’s industrialization process and climb higher on the developmental ladder, Ethiopia is 
spending about 20% of its GDP to reengineer its infrastructure, such as roads, schools, railways, 
air transport, dams, and telecommunication services.  The economy is controlled by the 
government and not entirely adapted to the market. To entice foreign investors, the Ethiopian 
government is giving special investment incentives to create a favorable environment for foreign 
capital. For example, contrary to the argument that the country could face depleted soil, dry 
aquifers, and a ruined ecosystem from chemical overuse (Mersha, 2009), Ethiopia is leasing 
virgin farmlands and bestowing tax holidays and tax relief to foreign investors.  However, 
foreign investors in the agricultural sector are crowding out domestic investors. Being less 
regulated to follow domestically-mandated requirements to reinvest some of their profits in 
Ethiopia, foreign corporations in Ethiopia are creating problems such as land grabs. In addition, 
few multinational corporations operating in Ethiopia are effective in creating jobs. They bring 
capital and technology, but are not helping Ethiopia to gain access to world markets for the 
benefit of Ethiopia. 
 
Democratic Governance 
According to the Malaysian government, democratic values are Western constructs, purposely 
designed to impose Western values on non-Western countries. Therefore, the Malaysian state is 
prolonging the conversion to democracy until it achieves sustainable development (Mohammed, 
T. 1994). Based on this stand, it is generally argued that development in Malaysia requires better 
state action and not Western-induced democratic values.  Currently the Malaysia state is 
governed by a powerful bureaucracy, incomplete democratic institutions, and limited political 
freedom. 
 
Unlike the Malaysian Developmental state, Ethiopia at times has exhibited appalling 
human rights violations. Even so, the EPRDF Party without undertaking institutional reforms 
appears to be implementing, simultaneously, the twin-tracked approach of democratization and 
developmental state. The EPRDF ruling party in Ethiopia constantly argues that it is applying 
fair, good governance and equitable administration, as well as fair judicial and electoral practices 
so that Ethiopia appears to be a democratic developmental state. Various opposition groups, on 
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the other hand, feel that because Ethiopia is strongly centralized, the ruling party is using 
democratic governance for window dressing. Instead of holding elections on a broad suffrage 
basis, the opposition parties argue that the outcomes of elections in Ethiopia have been 
fraudulent and undemocratic.  Though the elections held in Ethiopia are based on broad suffrage, 
those elected are mainly political cadres and the outcomes of the elections have been 
predetermined. During the 2010 election, for example, the US Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, and the Chief European Union (EU) observer, Thijis Berman, 
argue that while the elections were peaceful and well organized, they were not played on an even 
playing field (BBC news, May 25, 2010). Moreover, the judiciary system currently in Ethiopia is 
executively controlled as an extension of the ruling party.  Since a prerequisite for democracy 
involves the participation of all concerned citizens in decision-making processes, the Ethiopian 
governance system needs to restructure its institutions to provide information held by public 
authorities to empower the masses and ensure the developmental state model bears fruit. 
 
Summary and Policy Implications 
Based on the analysis given in Table 2, it can be concluded that unlike the conceptual framework 
forwarded by the Economic Commission for Africa, Ethiopia’s democratic developmental state 
is unique, different from the Malaysian developmental state model. Economically, Ethiopia has 
recorded a staggering economic growth.  From 2005-2011, as targeted by the Developmental 
state, Malaysia’s GDP grew at 5.23%. The incidence of poverty in Malaysia has declined from 
49% in 1970 to less than about 5% in 2000. Without speeding the direction of industrialization 
and mainly being plan-oriented rather than being a full market-oriented system, from 2005 to 
2011, Ethiopia achieved an average of 9.9% growth rate in its GDP.  With the miraculous 
economic growth, the poverty reduction in Ethiopia as measured by poverty head count has 
declined from 41.9 in 2005 to 29.6 percent in 2011. However, unlike the Malaysian 
developmental plan which is based on free market economic system, Ethiopia seems to be 
portrayed as a predatory state that has embarked on a state-led market system. 
 
The Developmental State Model assumes that the organizational set-up of the state needs to be 
manned by highly disciplined professional government functionaries and technocrats, recruited 
based on meritocracy to fulfill clearly spelled out functional obligations. Also, it is assumed that 
non-partisan professional public service is a prerequisite to a developmental state. However, the 
developmental plans in Ethiopia are too ambitious and have not been founded on a well-
established financial and infrastructural base that could have engineered Ethiopia’s take off 
strategy.  In fact it can be argued that Ethiopia’s plans have been designed solely by politicians 
without taking feedback from the private sector.  As it stands now, Ethiopia’s developmental 
state is not operating in a market-friendly environment. A number of the government-initiated 
developmental plans are either obstructed or unduly delayed for implementation because some of 
the government functionaries lack the professionalism or commitment needed to mobilize the 
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limited resources of the nation. They appear to be interested in maximizing their own benefits by 
imposing hidden rent-seeking agendas. 
Table 2: Developmental State or Democratic Developmental State 
in Malaysia and Ethiopia: A Comparative Overview 
Indicators Malaysia Ethiopia 
Economic Growth 
 
 
For the last seven years, (i.e., 2005-
2011), Malaysia’s GDP grew at 5.23 
percent. As targeted by the Malaysian 
Developmental target, the incidence 
of poverty in Malaysia declined from 
49% in 1970 to about 5% in 2000. 
Similarly, due to poverty reduction 
and access to health services and the 
expansion of the Malaysian 
economy), the HDI of Malaysia 
improved only by 3.1% from 2005-
2011. 
 
Seventy percent of school age 
children in Malaysia complete 
primary and secondary schools; only 
24 percent of Ethiopian children 
complete their primary and secondary 
schooling. Thus, Malaysia gives more   
emphasis on investment in human 
capital as an important ingredient for 
economic transformation as asserted 
by its developmental state model. 
 
 
 
 
From 2005-2011, Ethiopia 
without speeding the direction 
of industrialization and mainly 
being plan-oriented rather than 
fully market-oriented, has 
achieved an average 9.9% 
growth rate in its GDP. 
With recorded economic 
growth, poverty reduction 
measured by poverty head 
count in Ethiopia has declined 
from 41.9% in 2005 to 29.6% 
in 2011. Due to poverty 
reduction, access to health 
benefits and expansion of the 
economy, the Human 
Development Index (HDI) 
improved by 16% but it is 
about 22% less than the 
average score of the sub-
Saharan countries. The 
Ethiopian developmental state 
seems to have played an 
important role in underpinning 
quantitative economic growth. 
However, low income people 
aren’t benefiting from the 
staggering economic growth of 
the country. The poverty ratio 
of people living on less than 
$1.25 a day is very close to 
30%. Ethiopia’s GDP 
expenditure on education is 
5.5%, compared to Malaysia’s 
4.6%.  But the education index 
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of Ethiopia is only 0.237 
compared to 0.73 for Malaysia. 
 
 
 
 
 
Vision of 
Developmental State 
Developmental model from Japan and 
South Korea. The 2020 Malaysian 
Vision was planned by its government 
with a clear vision of development to 
attain a fully developed nation, to 
facilitate growth with improved equity 
and to reduce poverty. It works 
cooperatively (or is embedded) with 
the private sector. 
Development model from 
Malaysia. In addition, the 
Ethiopian state envisions a 
democracy that ensures 
popular participation. Its plans 
entail not only to attain the 
Millennium Development 
Goals by 2015 but also to 
becoming a middle income 
country by 2020- 2030. 
Professional  and 
Meritocratic 
Bureaucrats 
The government bureaucrats are 
recruited through a rigorous national 
examination system and they carry 
out their duties autonomously without 
interference from politicians. 
Civil servants are by and large 
recruited on meritocracy but 
are at the discretion of the 
Ethiopian Peoples 
Revolutionary Democratic 
Front (EPRDF) to carry out 
their duties. . 
Insulation of 
Bureaucracy from 
Political and Societal 
Forces 
 
 
 
 
The Malaysian developmental state 
goal is to achieve rapid economic 
development. Thus, it gives power 
and authority to the bureaucracy to 
plan, supervise and implement 
efficient policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethiopian elites are highly 
skilled and well-motivated 
individuals who are the most 
talented graduates of 
universities in the country and 
from abroad. Nonetheless, 
because they are recruited 
according to ethnic affiliation, 
they are strongly influenced by 
the ruling party. 
The Economic 
System and Foreign 
Direct Investment 
The Malaysian economy is largely 
market driven, planned by 
professional elites who also gets input 
from the private sector, and is 
accountable to the public. The 
The Ethiopian economy is 
largely controlled by the 
government and not entirely 
tailored to meet market supply 
and demand. To entice foreign 
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Malaysian economy is competitive 
and its growth trajectory is based on 
the global market. 
investment, the government is 
in the process of creating an 
investment-friendly 
environment for foreign 
investors..But, foreign firms 
are crowding out domestic 
investors. 
Democratic 
Governance 
 
Malaysia looks at democratic values 
as Western constructs, not 
transferrable to the Malaysian 
environment.  Therefore, it is 
generally agreed in Malaysia  that 
development requires better state 
action and not Western induced 
democratic values to achieve 
sustainable development.  In short, 
The basic argument in Malaysia is 
development first and democracy 
later. 
 
Without undertaking 
institutional reforms tailored to 
facilitate human rights, the 
Ethiopian People 
Revolutionary Democratic 
Front  (EPRDF), seems to be 
committed to a process of 
implementing simultaneously 
the twin-tracked approach of 
democratization and 
development. 
 
Bureaucratic elites who design and manage Ethiopia’s short and long term plans are not 
politically neutral and do not get necessary feedback from the public. Therefore, if Ethiopia 
desires to use the state as a very important vehicle to tackle its deep-seated developmental 
problems, it needs to create a system for constant improvement of its public administration sector 
to keep employees politically neutral and professionally competent and to ensure that the 
appointment of government elites is transparent and based on due process. 
 
At present, based on the analysis, it can be concluded that the Ethiopian political system is 
neither a developmental state like Malaysia nor striving towards the ideals of a democratic 
developmental state. It seems confounded, giving the appearance of operating as a centrally-
planned economic system. However, the bureaucracy is not disciplined. Its management system 
manifests extreme forms of inefficiency and endemic corruption. Given that Ethiopia’s existing 
developmental state model is dysfunctional, it has been an obstacle to the implementation of 
well- intentioned poverty-minimizing reforms. It is weighted down by rent-seeking abuse and an 
inefficient organizational set up.  If Ethiopia desires the Malaysian developmental state to be its 
role model it needs to institutionalize a free market system, retool its infrastructure, create 
institutions capable of staging the necessary developmental state, and free the bureaucratic elites 
from political influence.  Since the foundation of a developmental state is based on good 
governance, Ethiopia like Malaysia needs to form a state run by autonomous professional elites 
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with the capacity to determine the direction of the country by getting necessary feedback from 
the public and private sectors. 
 
 
Finally, the question must be asked, “Is the Malaysian Developmental State Model the right one 
for Ethiopia?” Economic globalization has caused the appreciation of currencies and precipitated 
a huge influx of direct foreign investment and portfolio capital into Malaysia.  However, the lack 
of prudent financial market regulations and the emergence of innovative investment practices 
have resulted in excessive private debt in hard currencies, fluctuation in asset prices, and severe 
exchange rate fluctuation. It is possible to argue that the distinctive Malaysian developmental 
state model that is suggested by the Economic Commission of Africa is too outdated to be 
replicated in Africa. In short, in this era of globalism, the Malaysian type of development may 
not be the right template for Ethiopia. If the Ethiopian government is willing to relinquish its 
direct control over many community organizations and abide by democratic values, it could 
sustain its economic growth and adequately feed its people, by going back to practicing 
sustainable agriculture because agriculture is the backbone of the Ethiopian economy. Ethiopia’s 
sustainable economic model should be based on integrated, environmentally sensitive, and 
cooperative agriculture because the lives of more than 30 million Ethiopians are at stake and 
living below the poverty line (see for example, Kofi and Desta, 2008).  Stated differently, if a 
democratic sustainable developmental state is to be effective in Ethiopia, a radical and far-
reaching set of constitutional revisions must be established to dismantle the bureaucratic-
executive state.  Since more than 80 percent of the Ethiopia population lives in rural areas, 
Ethiopia needs to intensify its agricultural base to feed its own people rather than to be aimlessly 
flirting with irrelevant Western capitalist models and attempting to replicate the Malaysian 
Developmental state model. 
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